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Preventing reverse engineering of black-box classifiers
ABSTRACT
Machine learning (ML) models trained for various purposes are generally kept
confidential, e.g., due to their commercial value, proprietary nature of training data, etc.
Therefore, commercial cloud-based machine-learning service providers protect their ML models
even as they provide one or more services to customers that employ ML models. For example, a
service enables a customer to upload an observation, e.g., an image, and receive a label for the
observation, generated by a ML model that’s trained to determine labels for images. Recent
research has shown that given a sufficient number of observations and returned labels, it is
possible to reverse engineer the ML model that generated the labels. This disclosure presents
techniques that thwart reverse-engineering efforts, e.g., by adversarial actors, by returning, for a
small fraction of input queries, not a true but a near-true class label.
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BACKGROUND
Commercial cloud-based machine-learning services generally work as follows.
Customers send observations, e.g., images, text, etc., via an API from the cloud-based ML
provider, and the service returns one or more class labels. Machine learning models used by such
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service providers are confidential and are not exposed to customers. ML models as a service are
available for a variety of verticals, e.g., for the recognition or labeling of text, image, video, etc.
For example, a customer might submit as input an image and request labels that are based
on recognizing objects or semantic concepts from the image. The machine-learning service
returns with labels and associated confidence measures, e.g., “lilac, with confidence 85%.” As
another example, a customer might submit an image of hand-written text as input, and request an
invocation of an OCR model. The machine-learning service returns tokens identified within the
input.
A risk for providing labels generated by the ML model is that a black-box ML model
(where internal details of the ML model are not exposed to the user) can be reverse-engineered
given a sufficient number of observations [1]. Providers of machine-learning services may be
susceptible to such adversarial attacks. Given the time and costs expended to obtain the diverse
training sets to train ML models to high performance, a reverse-engineered theft of ML model
can be a significant loss to such service providers.
DESCRIPTION
The techniques of this disclosure counter reverse engineering of a ML model by
returning, for a fraction of input queries, not a true but a near-true (or nearest-neighbor) class
label.
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Fig. 1: Preventing reverse engineering of black-box classifiers

Fig. 1 illustrates deterrence/prevention of reverse engineering of black-box classifiers, per
techniques of this disclosure. A customer (102) is in interaction with a machine-learning service
provider (104) via a cloud interface/API (108). The interface enables the customer to provide
observations, e.g., unlabeled data (106), and receive labels, as determined by the ML service
provider.
Upon receipt of the unlabeled observations, the ML service provider routes these inputs
to various ML models that correspond to various verticals, e.g., OCR model (110), logo model
(112), apparel model (114), video-labeling model (116), etc. The models return labels, typically
with confidence metrics, for the input observations.
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If the incoming data set of observations is indicative of risk of reverse engineering (122),
then the following procedure is invoked. The nearest neighbor label is computed on a small
fraction of labels (118). The true label is overwritten with the nearest neighbor label (120). A
(key, value) pair is returned to the client via the API. The API returns labeled data (124) to the
customer. The feature set of the input observation is stored internally along with the nearest
neighbor label (126). Such stored feature set is utilized to prevent a duplicate (or near-duplicate)
of the input observation being labeled with the true label in a future query. In this context, a
nearest neighbor label may refer to a nearest neighbor, a second-nearest neighbor, a third-nearest
neighbor, etc., such that the returned label is sufficiently inaccurate to forestall reverse
engineering, while still being close to the true label.
Incoming client observations can be considered risky if the observation set is unusually
large, if the client’s request is atypical in some way, if a reputation analysis of the client shows a
possibility of maleficence, etc. To facilitate detection of suspicious queries, a running counter of
customer queries is maintained over the lifetime of queries from customers. This running counter
can also detect customers who batch their datasets incrementally.
Alternative to a nearest-neighbor label, a suspect incoming query can be answered with
a label that is higher up a taxonomy chain, e.g., has reduced precision. This is possible because
many ML models return a taxonomic chain for a label, e.g., an image of a tiger may be labeled
as animal→mammal→cat→tiger. Rather than returning a label at the finest level of
classification accuracy (e.g., tiger), a suspect incoming query can be labeled at a coarser level of
classification accuracy (e.g., cat or animal). Still alternatively, a suspect incoming query can be
answered with a label that is not necessarily the nearest neighbor but nevertheless has a lower
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confidence measure, e.g., poorer quality of classification, or a label that is selected randomly
Further, manual methods or heuristics can be utilized to identify adversarial actors.
In cases where the performance of particular ML models is known to be less than
excellent, e.g., due to sparse training data, a true label can be returned to the client so as to not
further erode the quality of classification. In a similar manner, models that face relatively few
queries (or have a limited set of customers) are configured to provide answers with true labels.
Customers who have been vetted, e.g., that are known to pose no risk of reverse engineering or
otherwise verified as non-adversarial, are always provided with true labels. Further, the
described techniques are not implemented in certain instances, e.g., for certain classes of queries
or use cases where even a minor inaccuracy may be deemed problematic, for customers where
service-level or quality thresholds are to be met, or where other mitigation mechanisms against
adversarial attacks are available.
CONCLUSION
This disclosure presents techniques that forestall efforts at reverse engineering black box
classifiers, such as ML models, of cloud-based service providers. Adversarial attacks, once
detected, are thwarted by returning, for a small fraction of queries, a nearest-neighbor label than
a true label, by lowering label precision, etc.
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